Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a towering and original work in the
philosophical cannon. Kant’s transcendental
idealism is designed to remove skeptical doubts about empirical science that
Hume had raised by asserting that space and time are conditions of experiences
that are internal to each of us.
However, Kant cautions that because space and time are internal
intuitions that condition our experience we can never know things in themselves
or noumena but only things as they appear to us or phenomena. If we forget this, Kant warns that we
will end up in endless philosophical muddles. Central to showing the necessity of transcendental idealism
are the antinomies of pure reason, which show that when we try to go beyond the
conditioned, that is experience within the bounds of space and time, we come to
intractably contradictory positions such as the universe in finite in time and
space and the universe is infinite in time and space. Kant wants to use the antinomies to motivate us to accept
transcendental idealism, because if we assume a transcendentally realistic view
of and think we can reach the things in themselves, we end up in the
intellectual mire of the antinomies.
In this paper I critically examine the
First Antinomy. I will argue that
there is no conflict between the thesis and antithesis of the First Antinomy
for a number of reasons. First, it
appears that the antithesis borders on circularity. The thesis argument is also not without its problems.
Second, I will contend that the first antinomy highlights a tension between
what Kant calls reason and understanding rather than a conflict within reason
itself, a point that Michelle Grier has recognized. I propose that the antinomies represent a divergence between
rationalism (as I will call it) and naturalism, a conflict that does indeed
seem intractable to many. Finally,
I argue that Kant’s transcendental idealism points a possible way this conflict
might be resolved. However, I
conclude that the power of the antinomies is not such as to force one to accept
transcendental idealism. In the
course of attempting the above, I will examine how Grier, who recognizes
similar issues in the antinomies, comes to a different conclusion than I do.
The point of Kant’s antinomies is to show
that reason wants to move from the conditioned, which is the world of
appearances that we experience in space and time, to the unconditioned. Kant wants to show how this desire to
move from the conditioned to the unconditioned gets us into trouble. Kant lays out two principles that are
the sources of this problem. First
reason urges us to:
find for the conditioned knowledge given through the
understanding the unconditioned whereby its unity is brought to completion.[1]
This first principle is that reason aims
to organize the concepts of the understanding. However, Kant maintains that because the world of sense is
conditioned by our internal intuitions of space and time we are falsely led to
think that the conditions of how this experience is possible is also given to
us and we are led to adopt principle two:
If the conditioned is given, the whole
series of all conditions, subordinated to one another – a series which is
therefore itself unconditioned – is likewise given, that is, is contained in
the object and its connection.[2]
This illegitimate urge to find the
conditions of the unconditioned leads us into intellectual cul-de-sacs, and
competing, contradictory claims. In
particular, it leads us to adopt competing antinomies, based on our particular
predilections, and that reason can show each of these antinomies to be equally
valid. Kant describes the role of
the antinomies in the following way:
If in using principle of the
understanding we apply our reason not merely to objects of experience, for the
use of understanding, but instead venture also to extend these principles
beyond the boundaries of experience, then there arise sophistical theorems,
which may neither hope for confirmation in experience nor fear refutation by
it; and each of them is not only without contradiction in itself but even meets
with conditions of its necessity in the nature of reason itself, only
unfortunately the opposite has on its side equally valid and necessary grounds
for its assertion.[3]
The first antinomy concerns whether or
not the universe is finite or infinite in space and time. The thesis position is that the
universe is finite in space and time and so had a beginning while the
antithesis states that the universe is finite in space and time and so has no
beginning. Kant’s point was that
reason could be used to prove either the thesis or the antithesis and as a
result, no one could ever prove the other position to be incorrect. The proponents of the thesis and
antithesis positions would argue themselves to a standstill. And so if reason leads to two
contradictory results, then it shows that there is something seriously
amiss. Kant uses this to argue
that the reason we are in this bind is because we are adopt a transcendentally
realist viewpoint, instead of a transcendentally idealist position. That because the conditions of space
and time are given to us in experience we reason that we can also discover the
conditions of the conditions, that is the conditions of space and time
themselves. Kant’s transcendental
idealism holds that are spatio-temporal viewpoint is given as part of our
understanding and that we cannot escape this. Thus he argues that we are not privileged to a God’s eye
view of the universe, whereby we can step outside of space and time. Kant argues that the antinomies result
from this desire to obtain this God’s eye view; a temptation that he sees the
force of but which we must do our best to avoid if we want to escape the
antinomies.
In the Appendix to the Transcendental
Dialectic, Kant recognizes the forces of the drive to discover the conditions
of the unconditioned, but cautions us to use this a regulative principle
instead of a constitutive principle. In fact Kant points out that reason’s
desire to find the condition of the unconditioned is necessary for our progress
in knowledge. So, he is fine with
its use as a regulative principle, and even considers it necessary as such.
However, do the antinomies actually show
that if we come at the world from a transcendental realist position that reason
will bring us to a place of deadlock?
In the following section I will critically examine the first antinomy in
order to see if there is a legitimate contradiction between the thesis and
antithesis position.[4]
I. The
First Antinomy - The Thesis Argument
In this section, I will take at look at
the thesis and antithesis arguments of the first antinomy in turn and point out
difficulties with each. Some which
trouble me, and other problems that have been pointed out by others.
The thesis of the first antinomy is that
“the world has a beginning in time, and in space it is also enclosed in
boundaries.”[5] Here I am going to focus on the first
part – that there is a temporal beginning to the universe. Here is Kant’s argument:
For if one assumes that the world has no
beginning in time, then up to every given point an eternity has elapsed, and
hence an infinite series of states of things in the world, each following
another, has passed away. But now
the infinity of a series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be
completed through a successive synthesis.
Therefore an infinitely elapsed world-series in impossible, so a
beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence; which was the
first point to be proved.[6]
Here is how I break down Kant’s proof:
1.
Assume
that the world has no beginning in time.
2.
If
the world has no beginning in time then an infinite series of successive events
has elapsed up to any given moment in time.
3.
An
infinite series of successive events can never be completed.
4.
Therefore,
an infinite series of successive events has not elapsed.
5.
Therefore,
the world had a beginning in time.[7]
Alvin Plantinga points out a problem of
circularity with the thesis argument of the first antinomy. Plantinga accepts that if one starts at
a finite point (as premise 2 in the argument above does) and attempts to count
back successive events to infinity (as premise 3 does), one will never reach
infinity so long as the successive events occur at a constant rate (the
conclusion in 4 above). However,
he thinks if one takes the first premise and assumes that the world has no
beginning, then there was no beginning point, and at every moment an infinity
would already have elapsed. So
given premise 1 above, at any point an infinite successive series of events has
already occurred, therefore, his claim is that premise 4, while it might follow
from premises 2 and 3, does not follow from premise 1. He writes:
…if the world has existed for an infinite
stretch of time, then there was no first moment, no first event, and no
beginning either to the series of moments or the series of events; more
generally, at any preceding moment an infinite time would already have
elapsed. To conclude, as Kant
does, that it is impossible that an infinite series of events has occurred is
just to assume that the series in question had a beginning – that is, is finite
– but that is precisely what was to be proved.[8]
I am not completely convinced that
Plantinga’s argument against the thesis position of the first antinomy is
successful. However, there are other formulations of arguments that the
universe in finite in time that escape Plantinga’s criticism. For example William Lane Craig has
offers the following kalam cosmological argument:
1.
Everything
that begins to exist has a cause
2.
The
universe began to exist
3.
Therefore,
the universe has a cause.[9]
Obviously, the work is being done mostly
in this argument by the second premise.
Craig offers the following argument in support of the second premise:
1.
The
temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition.
2.
A
collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
3.
Therefore
temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.[10]
Taking
the kalam cosmological argument set out above and the argument in support of
the second premise of the kalam cosmological argument, we have an argument for
the thesis position that is does not fall subject to Plantinga’s
criticism.
The
First Antinomy – The Antithesis Argument
The antithesis states that “the world has
no beginning and no bounds in space, but is infinite with regard to both space
and time”.[11] Here is how Kant lays out the argument:
…suppose that it [the world] has a
beginning. Since the beginning is
an existence preceded by a time in which the thing is not, there must be a
preceding time in which the world was not, i.e., an empty time. But now no arising of any sort of thing
is possible in an empty time, because no part of such as time has, in itself,
prior to another part, any distinguishing condition of its existence rather
than its non-existence (whether one assumes that it comes to be of itself or
through another cause). Thus many
series of things may begin in the world, but the world itself cannot have any
beginning, and so in past time it is infinite.[12]
Again, I am going to concentrate on the
claim that the world or the universe has no temporal beginning. My formulation of Kant’s argument is as
follows:
1. Assume the world has a beginning.
2. If the world has a beginning, it was
preceded by a time in which it was not.
3. If there was a time where the world was
not, this was an empty time.
4. Nothing can begin in an empty time.
5. Therefore, the world had no beginning.
It could be argued that this argument
borders on circularity, or begs the question. That is to say, that it is in danger of assuming its
conclusion in its premises. The
conclusion of the argument of the antithesis of the first antinomy is that time
is infinite and so the universe must have had no beginning. The essential premise to this argument
is premise four that no cause of the universe could arise in empty space and
time. This seems to be assuming that
only natural causes, i.e., causes that occur within space and time can have an
effect. So, an effect that
occurred beyond space and time would not make sense. However, this is an assumption of naturalism, that all
events are due to natural causes.[13] The conclusion sought is a naturalistic
one, that the universe is infinite.
So, if one assumes naturalism as part of the premises, and then one
comes to a naturalistic conclusion, it should not come as a complete
surprise. That is to say that if
one assumes naturalistic causation then reality will be co-extensive with space
and time and therefore infinite.
If I am correct that the antithesis of
the first antinomy is indeed circular, this has some important
consequences. First, the conflict
between the thesis and the antithesis of the first antinomy is neutered. Unless one can show a similar fault in
the logic of the thesis, the thesis must be seen to win out. Even if the logic of the thesis is also
suspect, and both the thesis and antithesis arguments are without force, the
conflict between the thesis and antithesis positions of the first antinomy is
without force. The second, issue is
that one is not driven automatically to embrace transcendental idealism if this
conflict between the antinomies can be defused. Perhaps, instead Kant’s suggestion of transcendental
idealism is still an option, just not one to which we are remorselessly
driven.
Instead, I want to suggest that Kant
points out that the conflict between the rational position of the thesis (which
Kant would label the urge to find the condition of the unconditioned) and that
of the naturalist that antithesis position can be solved if they accept a third
option – transcendental idealism. The
position of transcendental idealism, which might be described as naturalism
with the possibility that there might be something more than the given physical
world. What Kant was trying to do
was create naturalism with the room for freewill.[14]
Brilliant as Kant’s compromise between
the rational position and naturalism might be, it does not seem to me to be
obligatory, but rather more like a choice of three possible outlooks – the
rational, the naturalistic, and the transcendentally ideal. Position one is that of pure reason,
position two is taken by those who assume naturalism, and position three is
Kant’s critical method of transcendental realism, a way of adopting naturalism
for empirical science while leaving opening the possibility of freedom, so that
morality is possible.
The search for a condition for the
unconditioned does not conflict with itself, but rather with what I have called
naturalism. So, it seems that the first antinomy does not show that reason’s
search for the conditioned of the unconditioned leads to intractable conflicts. Perhaps, there is no conflict because
neither the thesis nor antithesis argument holds water, or perhaps a reformed
argument for the thesis position is effective and so wins the battle over the
antithesis position. Alternatively,
the thesis and antithesis positions emphasis different things - the thesis, the
rational position, and the antithesis, the naturalistic position. Michelle Grier presents a challenge to
this objection that I will examine later in the paper, but first I want to
examine another potential issue, whether the antithesis position of the first
antinomy assumes transcendental idealism.
Does the Antithesis Assume
Transcendental Idealism?
Even if one questions my contention in
the preceding section that Kant’s argument for the antithesis is circular or begs
the question, there is an issue whether or not the argument for the antithesis
assumes a transcendentally ideal viewpoint rather than a transcendentally
realistic viewpoint. This would be
a problem because it is the use of a transcendentally realistic viewpoint, the
quest for the conditions of the unconditioned, that Kant holds drives us to the
thesis and antithesis positions in the antinomies, and that instead one should
maintain a transcendentally idealistic viewpoint. So, if the antithesis assumes a transcendentally idealistic
viewpoint this would fail to show how adopting a transcendentally realistic
position leads to intractable contradictions.
As I set out the argument above most of
the work is being done by the fourth premise. But is this premise plausible, especially if one looks at it
from a transcendentally realistic perspective? If one had a truly God’s eye view and so could transcend
space at time, would the fourth premise present a difficulty? Is reason able to imagine an empty
time? It seems that reason is the faculty
that aims to go beyond the conditioned to find the conditions of the
unconditioned, so why would reason become bogged down in the conditioned, i.e.,
space and time, unable to imagine an empty time? Of course when Kant refers to faculty he is not meaning a
particular physical thing. This is
exactly what Kant tells us that reason does when it uses the drive to search
for the conditions of the unconditioned as a constitutive principle rather than
a merely regulative one. So, when
Kant states that nothing can begin in an empty time, is he assuming that we
cannot escape space and time, that space and time are internal conditions that
make experience possible, i.e. assuming transcendental idealism.
So, in his proof for the antithesis of
the first antinomy does Kant assume a transcendentally idealistic viewpoint,
where one cannot step outside of space and time? The point of the antinomies is to drive one to embrace
transcendental idealism by showing how transcendental realism becomes tied up
in contradictions between the thesis and the antithesis. But, if the antinomies show that the
transcendental realist and idealist position conflict, this is to be expected. It also does not show the need for
transcendental idealism.
Grier’s Response
Having said what I did above about the
problems of the antithesis of the first antinomy being circular or assuming
transcendental idealism, I want to make sure that I am not being uncharitable
to Kant’s position or misconstruing it in some way. Michelle Grier has recognized problems similar to the ones I
raised above, so I want to take a look at her interpretation, and use it to
determine if there is something that I have missed or failed to grasp.
Grier points out in relation to the first
antinomy that the thesis side can be seen as the point of view of reason that
wants to go beyond the conditioned, which is our standpoint in space and time.
While the antithesis point of view is the point of view of understanding as
Kant defined it being conditioned in space and time. She points this out as a
challenge to the position that the first antinomy shows a conflict of reason
with itself. So, rather than
pointing out the deficiencies of reason going beyond the conditioned and ending
up with contradictions of the antinomies, she suggests that the antinomies show
instead the tension between reason and understanding. She writes:
I am clearly suggesting that what Kant is
doing is pitting the attempt to comprehend things through the abstract use of
the understanding against the attempt to do so in accordance with the
principles of sensibility…it seems that there then can be no real conflict at
work in the antinomies after all.
It this is so, then Kant’s efforts to have isolated a genuine conflict
of reason with itself and, indeed, his use of this conflict as further proof
for his own transcendental idealism amount to a rather grandiose inflation of a
mere ‘tension’ between different (ultimately compatible) tendencies of our
thinking, and it really proves nothing of substance beyond this.[15]
So she recognizes the problem that I am
having in seeing how the first antinomy presents a conflict of reason with
itself; that as I put it earlier in the paper, the thesis represents what I
have called the rational position, while the antithesis represents what I have
called the naturalistic position.
Grier considers whether the thesis and the antithesis of the first
antinomy are not actually in conflict because the thesis is considering the
world in general while the antithesis is concerned with the world as we find it
in space and time.
What is Grier’s response to this
problem? Because of course if the
thesis and antithesis show tension rather than all-out conflict one is not
driven to transcendental idealism.
Grier recognizes the tension between the thesis and the antithesis; that
the thesis goes beyond the space and time whereas the antithesis assumes space
and time. Her solution, however,
is that the antithesis position assumes space and time not as intuitions but as
things in themselves. Therefore,
she argues that just as the thesis position assumes that it can reach things in
themselves, the antithesis also assumes that space and time are things in
themselves. Consequently, she
points out that Kant’s solution of transcendental idealism is still the
solution to the problem because both the thesis and antithesis position result
from trying to reach the noumenal world.
She writes:
…the theses take pure concepts to be
materially informative, and so yield general metaphysical conclusions, the
antitheses take what are for Kant merely the subjective forms of our intuition
to be universal ontological conditions.[16]
The conclusion of transcendental idealism
is that we can never thus know whether the thesis or the antithesis position is
correct because of our internal intuitions of space and time. If we take space and time to be things
in themselves then we should favor the antithesis.
For the purposes of the argument of the
antithesis what is the difference in taking space and time to be internal
intuitions that we cannot go beyond or taking them as things in themselves that
we cannot go beyond? If we take the first antinomy and replace the assuming of
space and time as things in themselves and rather treat them as intuitions that
condition our experience of the world, do we arrive at a different result? It
seems that we do. Here is how I
set out Grier’s antithesis argument for the first antinomy (GAA).
1.
Assume
the world has a beginning.
2.
If
the world has a beginning, it was preceded by a time in which it was not.
3.
If
there was a time where the world was not, this was an empty time.
4.
But
we cannot experience an empty time.
5.
Therefore,
we cannot know if the world had a beginning.
We arrive at the conclusion that we
cannot know if the antithesis position is correct. But we must keep in mind that transcendental idealism is
posed as a solution to the problem of the antinomies. Does this epistemic
reading of Kant drive us to accept transcendental idealism or solve the problem
that the antinomies do not show a conflict of reason with itself but rather a
tension between the rationalistic and naturalistic; what Kant labels the
position of Plato and Epicurus respectively;[17]
Plato’s conception that ultimate reality is beyond space and time and Epicurus’
conception that ultimate reality and space and time are co-extensive.[18]
These are equivalent to the positions I am calling rationalism and naturalism
in this paper. So, Grier’s
conclusion is that one cannot know if either of these positions is true because
one cannot escape one’s internal intuition of space and time.
But does my problem raised earlier remain
– that the antinomies do not inevitably lead one to embrace transcendental
idealism, but rather that transcendental idealism is a compromise between
rationalism and naturalism, or between Plato and Epicurus? That if the antinomies do not
effectively show us the intellectual bankruptcy of these positions in relation
to transcendental idealism, that there is no reason to choose the Kantian
outlook over the Platonic or Epicurean.
Further, if the thesis position is stronger than that of antithesis due
to the inherent circularity of the antithesis argument, where does that leave
us?
The question is why accept that space and
time are internal conditions of our understanding and are so transcendentally
ideal rather than transcendentally real.
Is Grier slipping back into assuming transcendental idealism into her
argument? That is to say, is she
making the same mistake in assuming the solution into the problem? If her version of the antithesis
argument of the first antinomy is as I have set it out in GAA above, then
clearly it assumes transcendental idealism. There is a hidden or assumed premise, so the full argument
should go as follows in GAA*:
1.
Assume
the world has a beginning.
2.
If
the world has a beginning, it was preceded by a time in which it was not.
3.
If
there was a time where the world was not, this was an empty time.
4* But
we cannot experience an empty time because time and space are internal
conditions of the understanding that make understanding possible.
5. Therefore,
we cannot know if the world had a beginning.
Replacing 4 in GAA with 4* in GAA* makes
it clear that GAA is depending on transcendental idealism to get its point
across. So again this is not a
case of being driven to transcendental idealism because transcendentally real
positions collapse into intractable arguments. So Grier’s solution does not seem to get us any closer to
establishing the need for transcendental idealism. This does not negate the point made earlier that even if the
antinomies do not force us to transcendental idealism, transcendental idealism
is still a position that can be adopted as a compromise between rationalism and
naturalism. One is not forced to
go down that road, but it may still be a road yet worth exploring in more
detail.
No
Conflict Between Reason and Understanding
I mentioned above in the previous section
that transcendental idealism even if one is not forced to accept it as a result
of the antinomies, may still prove to be very useful as a compromise between
rationalism and naturalism; rationalism representing in Kant’s term – reason,
and naturalism representing in Kant’s term – understanding. However, reason and the understanding
do not always come into conflict, even concerning issues such as whether the
universe is infinite in time or came into existence at a finite point in the
distant past.
Another consideration, if
the antinomies do not present an example of reason conflicting with itself but
a tension or conflict between reason and understanding (or sensibility), do
reason and understanding always come into conflict with each other such that
transcendental idealism is necessary to adjudicate between them? I think that one can argue that reason
and understanding can go hand in hand, and often do so. For example, the thesis of the first
antinomy could be construed as not in conflict with sensibility and in
particular data from the Standard Model of theoretical physics, which explains
the origin of the universe in the Big Bang from the singularity. In that case, data from the scientific
sensible world could be used to confirm the thesis of the first antinomy. One might object that scientific data
such as the Standard Model does not show a beginning of the universe, but my
point is that there is no necessary conflict between reason and sensibility.
So, for example, the alternative argument
for the thesis position, the kalam cosmological argument that I reference
above, uses not just philosophical arguments to support its second premise that
the universe had a beginning. Two
scientific evidences are also offered as proof of this premise, the Standard
Model of physics and the second law of thermodynamics.[19] The Standard Model of physics holds
that the universe began at the Big Bang.
The second law of thermodynamics, states that the universe as a closed
system will eventually reach a low entropy state where energy is evenly
distributed throughout the universe, which will result in the heat death of the
universe. The second law of
thermodynamics is used to show that the universe has not existed for an
infinite period of time because if it had the universe would already be in a
low entropy state. So, reason and
understanding, the rational and the empirical can work together as they do in
the kalam cosmological argument, and so are not always destined to fight
against one another.
Kant uses the contradictory
positions of the antinomies of pure reason to show the need to adopt
transcendental idealism. However,
the critical analysis above of the first antinomy puts this in some doubt. Kant’s argument for thesis position
that the universe is finite in time is not completely airtight. It may be that a different argument for
the thesis position, such as the kalam cosmological argument referenced above,
would be more successful. However,
Kant’s argument for the antithesis position that the universe is infinite in
space and time is also problematic.
Instead it seems more appropriate to view the thesis position as a
tension between reason and understanding.
That is to say that the thesis position is that of rationalism and the
antithesis position as that of naturalism. Michelle Grier recognizes this tension, but her suggestion
to save Kant’s theory is not successful as she assumes transcendental idealism
as part of her argument.
Therefore, the force of the first antinomy is somewhat less than it
first appeared, and so one is not forced by the first antinomy to accept
transcendental idealism. Kant’s
transcendental idealism may still be a compromise position between rationalism
and naturalism, but the first antinomy does not force this choice. Lastly, perhaps this compromise isn’t
even necessary as reason and understanding can work together as in the kalam
cosmological argument, which uses scientific proofs to support its premises.
Bibliography:
Allison,
Henry E., Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
Craig,
William Lane, The Kalam Cosmological Argument
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1979).
Grier,
Michelle, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
Kant,
Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason,
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
Papineau,
David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
.
Plantinga,
Alvin, “Kant” in Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000), 3.
[1]
Kant (A308/B364). References to the
Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and
second editions. All quotations
are from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998) except where stated.
This quote is from Michelle Grier, Kant’s
Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 119 citing the Norman Martin Kemp translation, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Kant (A421/B449).
[4] Due to concerns about space I have
limited this paper to an examination of the first antinomy. However, the other antinomies present
similar difficulties. Moreover, if
one can show a lack of contradiction within one of the antinomies, this will
severely weaken Kant’s case that there is a conflict in reason that should lead
one to embrace transcendental idealism as the only possible solution to this
conflict.
[5] Kant (A426/B454).
[6] Ibid.
[7] Others, like Allison and Grier, break
this argument down differently.
[8] Alvin Plantinga, “Kant” in Warranted Christian Belief (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 25.
[9] William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1979), 63.
[10] Ibid. 103.
[11] Kant (A427/B455).
[12] Ibid.
[13] A more complete definition of naturalism
is as follows: that reality is exhausted by nature, containing nothing
‘supernatural’, and that the scientific method should be used to investigate
all areas of reality, including the ‘human spirit’. Papineau, David,
"Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
.
[14] Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason wants to leave the door open for human
freedom as this will be important for his moral theory. He writes:
Thus in the judgment of free actions, in
regard to their causality, we can get only as far as the intelligible cause,
but we cannot get beyond it; we can know that actions could be free, i.e., that
they could be determined independently of sensibility, and in that way that
they could be the sensibly unconditioned condition of appearances. Kant (A557/B585).
[15] Michelle Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 193.
[16] Ibid. 210.
[17] Kant (A471-2/B449-500).
[18] Grier, Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, 183.
[19] Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, 110-140.
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